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Abstract  
International politics affects oil trade. But why? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing 
companies over 1986-2008 to examine what kinds of firms are more responsive to change in “political 
distance” between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General 
Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms 
diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We 
conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, 
because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To test this hold-up risk hypothesis, we 
investigate heterogeneity in responses by matching transaction-level import data with firm-level 
worldwide reserves. Our results show that long-run oil import decisions are indeed more elastic for firms 
with oil reserves overseas than those without, although the reverse is true in the short run. We interpret 
this empirical regularity as that while firms trade in the spot market can adjust their imports immediately, 
vertically-integrated firms with investment overseas tend to commit to term contracts in the short run even 
though they are more responsive to changes in international politics in the long run. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Churchill’s days the key to “energy security” has been thought to be oil 
diversification, and perhaps because of that many oil-poor countries have developed 
overseas oil-development policy to ensure equity oil can be imported readily. 3 Oil 
investment by multinational companies is indeed the one of the oldest forms of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the developing world, and today there is more trade 
internationally in crude oil than any other goods. It is not difficult to understand that 
import decisions from national oil companies are subject to state influence.4 However, 
when import decisions are decentralized among private firms, is oil trade still affected 
by international politics? At the end, is it irrational for ExxonMobil Corporation and 
ConocoPhillips, two of the largest US oil companies, to abandon their multibillion-dollar 
investments in the heavy oil deposits in Venezuela following the breakdown of the 
negotiations with Hugo Chavez’s government in 2007? 
Understanding the political determinants of oil trade is important, especially in 
a time of concern about sustainable development and energy security. In this paper, we 
ask the following questions: (1) Do political tensions between states reduce oil trade 
when import decisions are highly decentralized? (2) To the extent that misalignment in 
political interests between states is an impediment to private oil imports, what firms 
are more responsive to changes in such a “political distance”? For example, compared 
with other trading or financial companies, are FDI-based imports from firms with oil 
                                                   
3 The idea of energy security can be traced back to the time when Winston Churchill 
changed coal to oil as a power source for the Royal Navy prior to the First World War. 
According to Churchill, “Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone” (55 Parl. 
Deb., H.C. [5th ser.] [1913] 1465 [U.K.]). 
4  The China-Venezuela oil deal is a case in point. The round trip voyage from Venezuela to the US Gulf 
ports is almost five times shorter than that to China, and hence any effort to diversify Venezuelan oil sales 
away from the United States to China does not appear to be cost effective. After all, it appears more than 
political rhetoric, when China deposits $8 billion in an infrastructure development fund in exchange for 
Venezuelan oil. 
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reserves overseas more sensitive to changes in international politics? Finally, (3) Are 
these FDI-based imports even more elastic when their trading partners are state-owned 
companies in developing countries where private property rights is less well protected? 
Unlike many policymakers, some economists maintain that the world oil market 
is “one great pool,” because crude oil is fungible in an integrated oil exchange market 
(Adelman, 1984). According to this view, the composition of global oil trade is irrelevant 
because with an organized market that facilitates trade among strangers, there should 
be no political limit on oil trade. In practice, however, there are two main reasons why 
oil may only be partially fungible. First, many oil companies from major oil-exporting 
countries are state-owned ones. Although some of these state-owned companies sell oil 
in the spot markets, most of them are still using term contracts (Slade, Kolstad, and 
Weiner, 1993).5 Compared with other firms that import mainly through spot oil trading, 
these oil-importing firms that are committed to term contracts may find it costly to 
adapt to changes in international politics in the short run.  
However, oil production involves massive upfront investments in exploration, 
and geological knowledge is country- or even oilfield-specific. In the presence of sizeable 
appropriable quasi rent (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978), it is common for bilateral 
oil trade to be subject to state influence with relationship-specific investment in 
exploration, refining capacity, and pipelines. Indeed, Hajzler (2012) shows that foreign 
firms in mining and petroleum are more vulnerable to expropriation.6 International 
                                                   
5 Unfortunately, existing evidence on the integrated-market view is based on movement of prices of 
different crudes traded in the spot market (e.g., Nordhaus, 2009). Although these spot and contract 
markets sell the same physical commodity, because of the many stipulations on the magnitude, price, and 
quality of the product delivered under long-term contractual arrangements, no arbitrage relation 
necessarily hold between spot and contract market magnitudes similar to those which hold between 
futures and spot market magnitudes. Wolak (1996) finds that in the case of the US steam coal market, 
there is a fairly large price premium on contract versus spot transactions. 
6 A related reason why oil is only partially fungible is that oil has to be refined, and refineries are built to 
handle specific types of oil. For example, according to the EIA, Venezuela’s crude oil is heavy and sour 
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contracts are largely self-enforcing (Thomas and Worrall, 1994). When one party of an 
international oil agreement becomes a hostile dictator, there are nontrivial risks of 
royalty and tax renegotiation as well as forced divestment.7 Therefore, the presence of 
political risk as such suggests that import from international oil companies with 
investment overseas may be more responsive to changes in international politics in the 
long run. 
Using voting records for the United Nations General Assembly to measure the 
degree of misalignment in political interests between country pairs, we first examine if 
private oil-importing firms in the United States diversifies their imports away from the 
political opponents of their government over the period 1986-2008. Consistent with 
previous macro evidence (Mityakov, Tang, and Tsui, forthcoming), we find American 
firms indeed diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity. Moreover, we find that large oil-importing firms are less responsive 
to changes in international politics in the short run, suggesting that these firms may be 
committed to term contracts within a year. 
To test the hypothesis that vertically integrated firms are more responsive to 
political risk in the long run, we investigate heterogeneity in responses by matching 
transaction-level import data with firm-level worldwide reserves. Our results show that 
long-run oil import decisions are indeed more elastic for firms with oil reserves overseas 
than those without, whereas the reverse is true in the short run. Finally, we also show 
that this political trade pattern appears only in the sample of oil-exporting countries 
                                                                                                                                                     
by international standards, and hence a significant fraction of the Venezuela’s oil production must go to 
specialized domestic and international refineries (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/venezuela/oil.html). 
7 Expropriation in the mining and petroleum sector has a long history. For instance, Kobrin 
(1984) documents that mining and petroleum expropriations accounted for 32 percent of all 
nationalizations over the period 1960-1979 period. 
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with higher risk of expropriation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents 
our initial evidence on the effects of international politics on oil imports from American 
firms. Our main results using matched data of oil imports and foreign equity oil are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We combine data from the following sources for our analysis. First, our firm-level crude 
oil imports data are taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The 
EIA dataset provides monthly oil imports data by transaction since 1986. We use this 
dataset to construct annual oil imports figure by firm. We obtain firm-level information 
on oil reserves overseas from the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) 150/100 International 
dataset. 
Data on political distance between country pairs are obtained from Dreher and 
Sturm (2012), which provides indices of political distance based on voting positions of 
country pairs in the United Nations General Assembly from 1970-2008. In particular, 
our measure of political distance, which lies between 0 and 1, is calculated as d/dmax, 
where d is the sum of metric distances between votes by a country-pair in a given year 
and dmaxis the largest possible metric distance for those votes.8 For instance, when two 
countries always cast the same vote for any proposal, their political distance is zero. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that UN votes are a reliable indication of the political 
alliances between countries, because the pattern of UN votes is strongly correlated with 
                                                   
8 Votes are coded as either 1 (“yes” or approval for an issue), 2 (abstain), or 3 (“no” or disapproval for an 
issue). 
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alliances and similarity of economic and geopolitical interest. Unlike other indices based 
on alliance portfolios, UN voting-based indices provide significant time-series variation 
in political distance. Following Dreher and Sturm (2012) and the majority of the 
literature, we focus on all votes (i.e., including both key and non-key votes). 
Data on standard gravity controls are taken from various sources. GDP and 
population data are taken from the Penn World Table. Our oil reserves data are 
obtained from EIA and BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Finally, data on 
expropriation risk in the oil industry are taken from Guriev, Kolotilin, and Sonin (2011), 
which provides a list of oil nationalizations, including formal nationalization, 
intervention, forced sale, and contract renegotiation. 
In the full sample, we have 149,801 observations from 60 exporting countries. 
The descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our analysis are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
3. Political Limits on Oil Imports 
In our analysis we employ the standard workhorse model in international trade: the 
gravity equation, which links trade flows between countries to distance between them 
and their (economic and/or demographic) sizes. Distance in this model is understood 
quite generally. It includes not only geographical distance but also could account for 
other factors that reduce trade. In our paper we focus on political relations as 
impediment to trade. 
In its multiplicative constant-elasticity form, the gravity equation for trade 
states that oil import of firm  from country  to the United States at year , denoted 
by  is inversely proportional to their distance  (which typically includes all 
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factors that might create trade resistance), and proportional to the product of the two 
countries’ GDPs, denoted by  and : 
(1)   , 
where , , , and  are unknown parameters, and  is an error term. Provided 
 is strictly positive, we can log-linearizing the above equation to obtain the standard 
representation of gravity equation: .  
Our point of departure from the traditional gravity model is our focus on 
international politics, and hence  measures the one-year lag of political distance 
between the United States and country  at year . The coefficient of interest is , the 
estimated impact of US foreign relations on the log of oil imports to the United States. 
Because crude oil export depends on oil endowment, we also control for oil reserves. In 
our first specification, we control for country fixed effects and country ’s population. In 
our second specification, we also control for year fixed effects. Adding year fixed effects 
captures all time-specific characteristic (e.g., global oil price, as well as US GDP, oil 
reserves, etc.). In our full specification, we also control for firm fixed effects. 
One consequence of the log-linearization is that zero trade observations are 
dropped from the sample. Because our focus is on oil imports of firms and the 
distribution of oil endowment is highly uneven across countries, the number of 
observations dropped is indeed quite large. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), 
we estimate the multiplicative form (1) using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
(PPML) estimator. The main advantages of the PPML estimator are that while it 
provides a natural way to deal with zero values of the dependent variable, it is also 
consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
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Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2 present the results using the full sample. The first row 
reports the estimates of the political distance coefficient, our variable of interest. In all 
the three specifications, there is a negative and statistically significant association 
between our measure of political distance and oil imports. In our full specification, for 
example, a point estimate of -1.176 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
political distance (0.122) is associated with a reduction in oil imports by 13 percent.9 
To examine the heterogeneity in responses among firms, we divide the sample 
into large and small ones, depending on the size of their averaged annual imports over 
time. Columns 4 to 6 (7 to 9) report the results using the subsample of the firms with 
averaged imports above (below) the median. These estimates suggest that large firms 
are less responsive to changes in international politics. This result is consistent with the 
conjecture that large oil-importing firms that are committed to term contracts find it 
costly to adapt to changes in international politics in the short run. 
 
4. Testing the Hold-Up Risk Hypothesis 
Our hold-up risk hypothesis suggests that vertically integrated firms with equity oil 
overseas are more responsive to changes in international politics. To test this 
hypothesis, we divide our sample into the firms with oil reserves overseas and those 
without.  
To facilitate comparison of the results using the full sample, the first three 
columns of Table 3 replicate the estimates reported in Table 2. Columns 4 to 6 (7 to 9) 
report the results using the subsample of the firms with (without) oil reserves overseas. 
                                                   
9 Implied responses to changes in political distance are computed as: exp(∆x*β)-1, where ∆x is change in 
distance measure in question and β is estimated coefficient.  
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These estimates suggest that, in the short run, firms with oil reserves overseas are less 
responsive to changes in international politics. This result is not surprising, since 
vertically integrated firms tend to be large oil importers. 
Table 4 reports the estimates for the effects of concurrent and different lagged 
political distance using the subsample of firms with oil reserves overseas. Consistent 
with our hold-up risk hypothesis, column 1 to 5 show that the effect of political distance 
is increasing over time. When the concurrent and all lagged measures of political 
distance are included in the regression, column 6 shows that the most significant (both 
economically and statistically) effect is due to the four-year lagged political distance. 
Similar results are reported in Table 5, using the subsample of firms without oil 
reserves overseas. Interesting, unlike those with oil reserves overseas, concurrent 
political distance discourages oil imports (column 5). Moreover, the magnitude of the 
effect is stable over time (columns 1-5). When the concurrent and all lagged measures of 
political distance are included in the regression, column 6 shows that only the second 
and third-year lagged measure of political distance are statistically significant. 
Moreover, the magnitude of these estimates is smaller than the four-year lagged effect 
in the subsample of firms with oil reserves overseas. In other words, vertically 
integrated firms with equity oil overseas are responsive to changes in international 
politics in the long run. 
Finally, Table 6 presents the results using the subsamples of exporting countries 
with and without experience of expropriation over the sample period. Columns 1 to 3 
replicate the estimates using the full sample. The rest of the table shows that, 
consistent with the hold-up risk hypothesis, the political effect on oil imports is indeed 
driven by countries with higher expropriation risk, measured by experience of 
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expropriation. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides new evidence of the relationship between international politics and 
oil imports using firm-level data. Using country-level data, Mityakov, Tang, and Tsui 
(forthcoming) shows that major powers (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Japan) diversify their oil imports (but not other imports) away from their political 
opponents. Netherlands, the only non-major power top oil importer with global oil giant 
operating overseas, also exhibits similar trade pattern. Although these results are 
consistent with the hold-up risk hypothesis, country-level analysis is susceptible to 
endogeneity problem, because of the concern of “oil diplomacy.” Our firm-level analysis 
provides further evidence that private firms indeed diversify politically in the presence 
of hold-up risk. In other words, even when international politics matter for oil trade, the 
politics-trade relationship has an economic origin. Our results reconfirm the hold-up 
risk hypothesis that highlights the cost of expropriation to developing countries that 
rely on exports of natural resource and resource-driven foreign direct investment. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
 
Sample : 149801 observations, 1986-2008 
     
Oil Imports 350.048 4061.913 0 197479 
Political distance (UNGA voting) 0.757 0.122 0.272 0.956 
Log exporter’s oil reserves 1.191 2.577 -5.006 5.587 
Log exporter’s GDP 8.495 1.180 5.117 11.646 
Log exporter’s population 9.599 1.707 5.328 14.091 
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Table 2: Political Distance and Oil Imports: Response Heterogeneity by Firm Size 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Political distance -1.298*** -1.180*** -1.176***  -1.231*** -1.080** -1.077**  -4.021*** -6.700** -6.698** 
 (0.284) (0.454) (0.453)  (0.288) (0.500) (0.500)  (1.252) (2.701) (2.700) 
Oil reserves 0.027 0.035 0.034  0.029 0.037 0.037  -0.087 -0.061 -0.061 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.027) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.080) (0.114) (0.114) 
GDP 0.466*** 0.456* 0.459*  0.458*** 0.434* 0.436*  0.944 2.231*** 2.231*** 
 (0.166) (0.255) (0.256)  (0.165) (0.259) (0.259)  (0.556) (0.480) (0.480) 
Population 0.545 -0.187 -0.188  0.559 -0.166 -0.165  -0.076 -2.243 -2.246 
 (0.461) (0.799) (0.799)  (0.480) (0.813) (0.813)  (1.162) (2.175) (2.176) 
            
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes 
            
Observations 
(# of countries) 
148254 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
 74742 
(60) 
74742 
(60) 
74742 
(60) 
 51977 
(40) 
51977 
(40) 
51977 
(40) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. Political distance is measured with a 1-year 
lag. Other control variables are measured in log. In columns (1)-(3), the regressions are estimated based on the full 
sample, in columns (4)-(6) only firms with total imports greater than the median value of average annual imports 
(i.e., average annual imports by firm > 12695.13) are included in the subsample and in columns (7)-(9) the 
subsample includes the rest of the firms (i.e., average annual imports by firm <= 12695.13).
17 
 
 
Table 3: Political Distance and Oil Imports: Response Heterogeneity by Oil Reserves 
Overseas 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Political distance -1.298*** -1.180*** -1.176***  -0.985** -1.043** -1.038**  -1.810*** -1.695** -1.695** 
 (0.284) (0.454) (0.453)  (0.495) (0.446) (0.446)  (0.336) (0.758) (0.758) 
Oil reserves 0.027 0.035 0.034  -0.010 -0.018 -0.020  0.066** 0.082** 0.082* 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.32) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) 
GDP 0.466*** 0.456* 0.459*  0.590 0.645*** 0.650***  0.338 0.283 0.281 
 (0.166) (0.255) (0.256)  (0.155) (0.195) (0.195)  (0.259) (0.379) (0.380) 
Population 0.545 -0.187 -0.188  -0.427 -0.356 -0.363  1.626** -0.162 -0.159 
 (0.461) (0.799) (0.799)  (0.438) (1.046) (1.047)  (0.782) (0.939) (0.940) 
            
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes 
            
Observations 
(# of countries) 
14824 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
 35225 
(58) 
35225 
(58) 
35225 
(58) 
 103940 
(55) 
103940 
(55) 
103940 
(55) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. Political distance is measured with a 1-year 
lag. Other control variables are measured in log. In columns (1)-(3), the regressions are estimated based on the full 
sample. In columns (4)-(6) only firms with world-wide reserves are included in the subsample, and in columns 
(7)-(9) the subsample includes the rest of the firms. 
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Table 4: Political Distance and Oil Imports: Lagged Effects in the Subsample of Firms 
with Reserves Overseas 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political distancet-1  -1.038** - - - - 0.217 
 (0.446) - - - - (0.412) 
Political distance t-2 - -1.579*** - - - -0.837** 
 - (0.526) - - - (0.368) 
Political distance t-3 - - -1.659**   -0.128 
 - - (0.672) - - (0.296) 
Political distance t-4 - - - -2.343*** - -2.011*** 
 - - - (0.800) - (0.719) 
Political distance t - - - - -0.430 0.616 
 - - - - (0.412) (0.522) 
Oil reserves -0.020 -0.026 -0.030 -0.036 -0.020 -0.040 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) (0.028) 
GDP 0.650*** 0.696*** 0.780*** 0.887*** 0.665*** 0.889*** 
 (0.195) (0.183) (0.189) (0.205) (0.200) (0.233) 
Population -0.363 -0.487 -0.459 -0.438 -0.340 -0.453 
 (1.047) (1.027) (1.016) (0.990) (1.080) (0.983) 
       
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 
(# of countries) 
35225 
(58) 
33166 
(57) 
31774 
(57) 
30353 
(57) 
35254 
(58) 
30295 
(57) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions in 
the table are estimated based on the sample of companies with world-wide reserves. 
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Table 5: Political Distance and Oil Imports: Lagged Effects in the Subsample of Firms 
without Reserves Overseas 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political distancet-1 -1.695** - - - - -0.463 
 (0.758) - - - - (0.397) 
Political distance t-2 - -1.883*** - - - -0.728* 
 - (0.673) - - - (0.4119) 
Political distance t-3 - - -1.724***   -0.665*** 
 - - (0.578) - - (0.252) 
Political distance t-4 - - - -1.622** - -0.708 
 - - - (0.655) - (0.563) 
Political distance t - - - - -1.429*** -0.651 
 - - - - (0.712) (0.471) 
Oil reserves 0.082* 0.080* 0.078* 0.076* 0.084* 0.085** 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040) (0.049) (0.038) 
GDP 0.281 0.322 0.361 0.439 0.320 0.343 
 (0.380) (0.389) (0.411) (0.433) (0.382) (0.363) 
Population -0.159 -0.425 -0.687 -0.962 -0.112 -0.939 
 (0.940) (1.055) (1.176) (1.309) (0.956) (1.320) 
       
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 
(# of countries) 
103940 
(55) 
97824 
(54) 
93774 
(54) 
89634 
(54) 
104030 
(55) 
89454 
(54) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions in 
the table are estimated based on the sample of companies without world-wide reserves. 
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Table 6: Political Distance and Oil Imports: Response Heterogeneity by Exporter’s 
Expropriation Risk 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Political distance -1.298*** -1.180*** -1.176***  -1.165*** -1.367*** -1.365***  -1.691* 0.132 0.140 
 (0.284) (0.454) (0.453)  (0.274) (0.413) (0.412)  (0.980) (3.028) (3.030) 
Oil reserves 0.027 0.035 0.034  0.043 0.044 0.044  0.029 0.014 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.028) (0.040) (0.040)  (0.063) (0.080) (0.080) 
GDP 0.466*** 0.456* 0.459*  0.419** 0.354 0.356  0.551 0.747 0.748 
 (0.166) (0.255) (0.256)  (0.189) (0.333) (0.332)  (0.414) (0.554) (0.555) 
Population 0.545 -0.187 -0.188  0.553 -0.296 -0.297  0.845 2.054 2.064 
 (0.461) (0.799) (0.799)  (0.475) (0.976) (0.976)  (1.318) (1.499) (1.501) 
            
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes 
            
Observations 
(# of countries) 
148254 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
 73646 
(28) 
73646 
(28) 
73646 
(28) 
 74608 
(32) 
74608 
(32) 
74608 
(32) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. Political distance is measured with a 1-year 
lag. Other control variables are measured in log. In columns (1)-3), the regressions are estimated based on the full 
sample. In columns (4-(6) only imports from the countries with the history of expropriations are included in the 
subsample, and in columns (7)-(9) the subsample includes the rest of the countries. The results of the regression 
presented in Column (9) should be interpreted with caution because the estimates for the firm fixed effects were not 
properly estimated.  
 
 
